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1 In tsarist Russia the nobility,  like the empire itself,  was a multiethnic entity.  Though
scholars began puzzling over the implications of this heterogeneity long ago, the “new
imperial history” elaborated over the past two decades has inspired scholars to look with
fresh eyes at the meaning and function of the soslovie system.1 This growing body of work
has challenged the traditional conception of a relatively static four-tiered hierarchy of
legal  estates and begun to unpack an array of  neglected social  categories and status
groups embedded within that hierarchy. Many of those groups inhabited the borderlands.
In fact, re-writing Russian history as the history of an empire has opened new terrain for
testing the boundaries of social categories and their utility as tools of empire building.
Most important for the purposes of this article, recent scholarship has demonstrated that
the relationship between imperial officials and indigenous elites often determined the
character and efficacy of tsarist rule in newly acquired territories.2
2 Indigenous elites certainly stood out as potentially valuable assets in a resource-starved
environment.  Their  fates  within  imperial  society  were,  however,  as  varied  as  their
backgrounds. Some served as temporary proxies for Romanov authority; others became
permanent fixtures in regional governance. Some were amenable to cooptation; others
resisted assimilation in any guise.  Efforts to push the discussion of elites beyond the
constrictive  language  of  submission  and  resistance  have  led  into  the  more  nuanced
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terrain of negotiation and accommodation. Parsing the dynamics of such processes is no
easy task, but it has proven to be a productive way of uncovering bits and pieces of the
lived experience of imperial rule.3
3 The  more  we  learn  about  borderlands  the  less  satisfying  the  geography  that  often
circumscribes discussions of non-Russian populations and the institutions that governed
them.  Elite  integration  was  a  core  element  of  the  relationship  between  center  and
periphery, but it had an equally important latitudinal dimension. Many imperial practices
had a similarly dual nature. In fact, one of the great strengths of Russian empire building
through  the  early  nineteenth  century  was  its  ability  to  balance  attempts  at
standardization with the  formal  acknowledgement  of  regional  particularities  ranging
from the Lithuanian Statute and shari’a law to the autonomous status of the Grand Duchy
of  Finland.  This  article  does not  argue against  the core-periphery approach that  has
revealed  so  much  about  the  complexities  of  imperial  rule.  Instead,  it  proposes  a
complementary framework for studying elite integration. The soslovie system, like the
empire itself, was not simply a set of vertically ordered relationships linking the court to
carefully defined cohorts or, in the case of the dvorianstvo (noble estate), of ranks and
ribbons linking the tsar to an individual servitor. It was a social and cultural construction
as well: wealth, marriage, lineage, service, education, and cultural background tempered
the notion of nobility as a purely ascribed status. The scholarly debate over the extent to
which the dvorianstvo constituted a self-aware corporate entity is alive and well, but the
histories  of  elite  integration  suggest  that  the  ennoblement  of  borderland  figures
engendered a reconceptualization of the implications and accessibility of noble status
throughout the empire.4
4 This process had roots in one of the most famous decrees of the eighteenth century.
Peter III’s decree proclaiming the emancipation of the nobles from obligatory service in
1762 inaugurated a century of rumination on the nature of the nobles’ suddenly vague
relationship with the state. Catherine II’s provincial reform (1775) and charters to the
nobility and towns (1785) then created a new architecture of governance. She sought to
harness the authority and (assumed) expertise of emancipated nobles by assigning a host
of judicial and social functions to the noble assembly in each province. While the impact
of these reforms in individual provinces awaits further study, many scholars agree that in
interior provinces they led to the divergence of the provincial  bureaucracy from the
provincial nobility rather than to a dramatic redefinition of the meaning and function of
the dvorianstvo.5 The parallel acquisition of tens of thousands of Polish szlachta, Cossack
starshyna,  Tatar  murzas,  and  Georgian  tsarevichi,  coupled  with  the  implementation  of
Catherinian  policies,  made  the  non-Russian  borderlands  unexpected  engines  in  the
evolution of the nobility.
5 This  evolution has  lingered in  the  shadows of  work done on the  implementation of
Russian rule in the borderlands. For more than a century and a half,  the majority of
scholarly works presented elite integration as the process (contentious or otherwise) of
drawing new populations into an existing body. According to this scheme, a manifesto
issued in the aftermath of annexation or conquest declares the elite of the new territory
the equivalent of Russian nobles. In time a committee is set up to oversee the pro forma
ennoblement  process,  and  members  of  the  local  elite  scramble  to  meet  the  criteria
cobbled together from the terms of the 1785 charter and the annexation documents.
Imperial officials initially appear willing to accept the local definition of social categories,
but as the years pass and the security of the frontier improves they become less willing to
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accommodate regional particularities. In the end, those who meet the criteria laid out in
the 1785 charter assimilate and serve the interests of the empire. The rest sink into the
differentiated but distinctly unprivileged mass of the peasantry, and the impact of any
compromises made along the way is confined to the status of the particular borderland
elite that elicited them.
6 The case of the Crimean murzas suggests that elite integration was not as localized or
narrowly defined a process as it might appear. The Crimean murzas were a small but
significant  elite  group.6 Baltic  Germans generally  outranked them and Polish szlachta
surely  outnumbered  them,  yet  the  Crimean murzas  exercised  the  minds  of  imperial
officials  for  nearly  six  decades.  There  is  good  reason  for  this.  The  murzas  were  a
diminutive population – never more than 500 at a given time – but they were Muslims in
an era of religious toleration, former vassals of the sultan in the age of Russian-Ottoman
rivalry, and heirs to steppe traditions in the midst of Russia’s attempt to reinvent herself
as a European state. Determining whether and how a murza might become a dvorianin
(nobleman,  pl.  dvoriane)  therefore  had  wide-ranging  logistical  and  ideological
implications.
7 The  rapid  chronological  progression  from  annexation  in  April  1783  to  Catherine’s
decision to apply the terms of the provincial reform in February 1784 and the charter to
the nobility in 1785 pulled the new province and its Muslim elite into broadly conceived
transformations of the administrative and social order.7 During the next fifty-five years
the rules, the stakes, even the meaning of noble status, were in flux across time and
space. Throughout this period the majority of Crimeans argued that they enjoyed the
privileges  of  Russian  nobility  by  virtue  of  being  murzas,  and  they  therefore  sought
confirmation  of  the  equivalency  Catherine  herself  had  drawn  between  murzas  and
dvoriane in the early days of Russian rule. Emperors, governors-general, senators, and
ministers weighed in on the issue, and three commissions convened to sort through the
murzas’ petitions and documentation. By 1827, a total of 295 murza petitions gained the
approval  of  provincial  officials,  and  most  everyone  involved  considered  the  matter
resolved.8
8 In 1840 however, a State Council decision struck all but forty members of the Muslim elite
from the noble register, drastically altering the landscape of nobility in Tavrida. They
were removed in part because the regime saw confession and ethnicity in increasingly
politicized terms – being Muslim and Tatar made it difficult to gain admittance to the
noble  estate  under  Nicholas I.  But  assessing  the  fate  of  the  murzas  solely  from the
vantage point of the Crimeans themselves masks a broader significance of their story.
Officials in St. Petersburg fretted over the ennoblement process unfolding in Simferopol
because  they  knew that  the  boundaries  separating  elite  entities  –  Russian  and non-
Russian, ranked and unranked – were porous, and that even seemingly localized policies
had  empire-wide  implications.  Thus  as  much  as  the  integration  of  Crimean  murzas
reveals about a particular iteration of the relationship between core and periphery, it also
suggests that we rethink the geography of social  categories and the dynamics of  the
process through which officials and elites continually curated noble society.
 
The trouble with Rodoslovnye Knigi
9 The dvorianstvo was never homogeneous, but it might have been the most well-ordered
stratum of Russian society. The Table of Ranks instituted in 1722 lent an air of credibility
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to the notion of  a  merit-based rank system and seemed to signal  a  shift  away from
traditional  honor-based  hierarchies  toward  principles  of  rationalization  and
bureaucratization. But that was only the beginning. By mid-century, the dvorianstvo was
in the midst of a sea change. With Tsar Peter III’s 1762 emancipation decree the figure of
the retired gentleman whiling away his hours in quiet contemplation or self-motivated
industry  on his  estate  was  no longer  confined to  the realm of  (foreign)  fiction.  The
legislative assembly of 1767 provided nobles with a venue for airing both grievances and
ideas about the regulation and function of social status, and a series of decrees in 1775,
1778, and 1785 redefined the noble assembly as a semi-autonomous entity endowed with
specific  privileges,  powers  and  obligations.9 Catherine’s  goals  were  to  ensure  the
sovereign’s monopoly on prestige, standardize the boundaries of noble authority, and
foster what she saw as the organic connection between estate owners and state servitors.
By some measures, her policies succeeded. In fact, one of the striking things about the
dvorianstvo is  its  apparent  demographic  consistency:  for  eight  decades  the  noble
population hovered just under one percent of the general population.10
10 Yet distinctions were built into the very foundations of noble society. Whatever their
location  or  concentration,  Catherine  subjected  dvoriane to  an  Enlightenment  project
concerned with rationalizing, ordering, and documenting. Inscription in the rodoslovnaia
kniga (noble register) for example, required proving one’s rightful place in a six-tiered
hierarchy that tethered noble status to service record or lineage.11 The true innovation of
Catherinian policy, was that it balanced this form of stratification with the generation of
cohesive  local  entities.  It  held  dvoriane responsible  for  presenting  satisfactory
documentation  of  their  ‘worthiness’  in  the  provinces  where  they  resided  or  owned
estates. Henceforth nobility would be managed at the provincial level according to rules
and procedures implemented in uniform fashion across the empire.12
11 Within a  short  time,  the Heraldry department  of  the Imperial  Senate shored up the
significance of provincial identity by producing a new symbolic language in the form of
coats of arms and dress codes. The socio-spatial ordering of the noble population became
entrenched enough that foreign observers were able to read crowds as though they were
reading a map. During Catherine’s famous journey to the Black Sea in 1787, for example,
the Prince de Ligne observed that “the provinces of the East [wore] brown and gold and
silver” to royal suppers, while “the others [wore] red and sky-blue.”13
12 This decentering of noble identification is crucial to understanding the dynamics of elite
integration in Tavrida. Despite the relative stability suggested by the annual aggregate
noble population, at the provincial level noble populations throughout the borderlands
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Figure 1. Change in the noble population of select provinces, by region
13 Numerous  variables  contributed  to  this  relative  volatility,  but  some  of  the  most
important were connected to the challenges of managing and eventually integrating non-
Russian, non-Orthodox elites. Russian officials serving in Tavrida were acutely aware of
the value of harnessing the social capital of the murzas and beys. “[We must] train them
imperceptibly in our customs, our amusements, the pleasure we take in our lives and
even in our work,” wrote one Tavridan noble:
This  is  all  the more important  because among the murzas there are those who
descended from Chingis Khan, and Your Excellency well knows in what high regard
and  with  what  level  of  respect  they  are  therefore  held  by  the  Muslim  people.
Whether they are indigent or legitimate heirs is immaterial – it is enough that the
crowds believe them… Their devotion to Russia, their acclimation to our way of life
secured,  they  might  in  future  prove  very  useful in  political,  military  and trade
relations with Turkey.15
14 Over the years Russian officials and their Muscovite counterparts had accrued substantial
experience in the art of incorporating Volga Tatars, Baltic Germans, and Polish magnates
into imperial society and the integration of the Crimean murzas might have been just
another iteration had it not been for the 1785 charter. The charter, with its insistence on
standardizing the definition and ascription of nobility across the empire, ran against the
grain  of  Catherinian  policy  in  newly  acquired  territories.  In  Crimea  for  example,
Catherine (along with Prince Grigorii Potëmkin, governor-general of New Russia among
other things) found it expedient to grant privileges to her new subjects and to assure
them that Russian rule would not entail  a radical  revision of  the social  hierarchy or
cultural institutions. The annexation manifesto thus promised, in return for the Tatars’
loyalty, “to allow each [subject] all the rights and privileges enjoyed by a Russian of his
status (sostoianie)” and to protect the faith and laws of the Crimean population. Just a few
months  later  Catherine  exempted  the  Crimeans  from  the  poll  tax  and  military
recruitment – two of the most onerous burdens imposed on the Russian population – and
later announced that the “worthy” among them had the right to acquire officer rank and
serve in the provincial government.16 While it might have seemed obvious that the beys
and murzas were the natural counterparts of the dvoriane, Catherine said nothing about
ennoblement; nor did she ascribe status to any element of the Crimean population.
15 A decree issued in February 1784 seemed to change all of that. The document allowing
“Tatar princes and murzas to enjoy all the privileges of the Russian nobility” is often
cited  as  evidence  of  the  integrative  capacity  of  the  dvorianstvo and  the  official
ennoblement of murzas from Bahçesaray to Kazan.17 It is true that it opened a formal
space for Muslim elites. As a result, nearly 5,000 murzas from 177 clans inscribed their
names in noble registers by the time Catherine died and by 1834 the registers of  15
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different provinces included murzas.18 However, the 1784 decree did not actually ascribe
noble status to the murzas. It allowed them to petition for it and instructed officials to
compile special lists of those murzas “worthy of the privileges granted to the Russian
nobility.” In other words, it upheld the equivalency drawn between dvoriane and Tatar
elites.
16 Elsewhere, Russian officials had used just such equivalencies to the empire’s advantage.
In the provinces of Left-Bank Ukraine (the Hetmanate’s autonomy was abolished in 1764),
they initially incorporated local traditions, accepting patents from Russian and Polish
rulers, evidence of ownership of settled land or Cossack starshyna status as acceptable
proofs of elite status. When written documentation of any kind proved scant, officials
accepted the  sworn testimony of  peers  to  attest  to  the  lineage  of  each applicant  in
accordance with the requirements of the 1785 charter. By 1790, over 20,000 petitions for
noble status from this region alone won approval on these grounds and although this
number  represented less  than two percent  of  the  provincial  population,  it  was  over
20 percent of the (male) noble population of the empire. Even more important than the
ethnic and regional imbalance was Catherine’s sense that her ennoblement procedures
had been manipulated to corroborate claims based on foreign criteria of noble status. The
Senate promptly demanded a review and by 1795 removed over ten thousand individuals
from the noble registers.19
17 Over  the  next  few  years  the  government  repeatedly  reminded  noble  assemblies
throughout the empire that their job was to recognize noble status, while the tsar alone
had the  authority  to  confer  it.  In  order  to  drive  this  point  home,  in  February  1803
Alexander  decreed  the  sworn  testimony  of  peers  insufficient  proof  of  noble  status
throughout  the empire.20 Ennoblement  henceforth required thorough documentation.
The  impact  of  this  decision  was  broad  and  immediate.  French  émigré  families,  for
example,  had no access to personal  or official  archives in France,  and even wealthy,
entrenched  Russian  nobles  were  often  plagued  by  problems  of  insufficient
documentation.
18 In a province like Tavrida where the vast majority of would-be nobles offered only the
testimony  of  peers  as  proof  of  their  descent  from  elite  clans,  this  was  potentially
catastrophic.  Aware  of  the  misfortunes  of  his  Ukrainian  peers,  Mehmet  bey  Şirin,
provincial  marshal  and  chief  of  the  most  influential  Crimean  clan,  led  the  Crimean
murzas in a spirited defense of their status as a discrete, autonomous entity within the
Russian elite. In an elegant exposition of this idea (composed in French, no less), Şirin
insisted  that  the  privileges  of  the  Crimean  murzas  were  indisputable  regardless  of
whether or not they inscribed their names in the noble register.  Grigorii  Potëmkin’s
successor Platon Zubov and Catherine herself had confirmed these privileges as recently
as September 1796.21
19 In an effort to maintain order, Governor G.P. Miloradovich convinced the tsar to convene
a  special  “commission  on  nobility”  to  determine  once  and  for  all  the  status  and
composition  of  the  Crimean  elite.  Provincial  Marshal  E.S. Notara,  though  hardly  a
supporter of murza interests, expressed his approval of the commission’s agenda. “The
Tatar  beys  and  murzas  of  this  province  do  not  simply  belong  to  noble  society,”  he
admitted to the minister of justice, “they constitute it.”22
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From Land to Lineage
20 The commission on nobility thus inherited the task of negotiating the thin line between
the terms of the 1785 charter on one hand, and the imperial legislation on Crimean elites
on the other. To complicate matters further, tsarist policy had begun to disaggregate
noble status and one of its core attributes – landownership. According to the charter, an
official document attesting to ownership (through grant or inheritance) of settled land or
villages was sufficient proof of a petitioner’s noble status. The relationship between the
right to own land and noble status was, after all, one of the pillars of premodern society
throughout much of Europe.23 In Russia, the conflation of landownership and nobility was
such that the word for landowner (pomeshchik) came to mean “nobleman” in common
parlance.
21 This  association  of  economic  and  social  privilege  began to  break  down in  the  early
eighteenth  century  as  merchants,  town  dwellers,  and  even  state  peasants  gradually
acquired the right to own land. In New Russia, where Potëmkin himself referred to all
who owned land (settled or otherwise) as pomeshchiki, landownership shed much of its
traditional  social  value.  And  in  Tavrida,  Catherine  announced  that  “All  merchants,
meshchane (lower-middle class townspeople), simple Tatars and others who are of Muslim
faith or other national origin, who are inhabitants of Tavrida and acquired lands under
the  khans  through  purchase,  inheritance,  or  other  legal  manner”  would  remain
landowners.24 This decision assured the Tatar population of a unique series of privileges;
it  also  removed  a  prime  motivation  for  ennoblement.  By  the  turn  of  the  century,
economic and social rights derived not from noble status, but from whether one was a
Crimean Tatar or not.
22 A similar  development  was  underway throughout  the  empire.  In  August  1798,  Paul I
allowed odnodvortsy (homesteaders) whose ancestors had possessed, but then lost, noble
status to re-petition according to the terms of the 1785 charter, and three years later
Alexander I  extended this  opportunity to almost  all  odnodvortsy,  including Lithuanian
murzas and the murzas of Kazan province.25 The widening distribution of landownership
rights was appealing to many of the influential figures who remained convinced that
there was a strong correlation between landownership and loyalty to the regime. In his
memoir on Tavrida for example, writer and statesman Ivan Matveevich Murav´ëv-Apostol
insisted that the only surefire way to guarantee stability in the province was to cultivate a
love of property among Crimeans.26
23 But fostering landownership and expanding the nobility were two different processes
altogether. In Tavrida, the dissociation of landownership and noble status theoretically
saved provincial officials the embarrassment of ennobling hundreds, perhaps thousands,
of  poor,  uneducated  landowners  with  no  traditional  standing  in  Crimean society.  In
practice however, a crucial safeguard remained in place. Individuals applying for noble
status solely on the basis of landownership could only be inscribed in the register if their
peers  expressed no doubt  about  their  “worthiness”  (dvorianskoe  dostoinstvo).  In  other
words, members of the local elite, assembly deputies, and particularly marshals, could
protect  their  collective  and  their  personal  interests  by  confirming  or  denying  the
legitimacy of a petitioner’s qualifications.27
24 Among Crimeans, those qualifications derived almost exclusively from lineage and clan
affiliation. Owning land in the khanate did not convert a Tatar peasant into a murza. By
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contrast, the status of a murza’s clan and his own position within that clan played a key
role in the resolution of disputes over ownership and inheritance brought before Russian
courts, which had pledged to respect and uphold local customs and Islamic law. In 1823
for example, the Evpatoriia district land court and Tavrida civil and criminal chambers
ruled that Abdişa bey Mansur could not legally alienate a 15- desiatina parcel near the
village of Bakal on the grounds that the land was part of the Mansur beylik (the land
controlled by a major clan). According to Crimean law, as bey (chief of one of the elite
Crimean clans) Abdişa had the right to use, but not to alienate land that belonged to the
clan.28
25 Murzas who took note of such decisions successfully tailored their arguments, grounding
them  in  Crimean  custom  rather  than  Russian  law.  Thus  in  1847  Neitşa  bey  Iaşlav
informed the noble assembly of his right to inherit the lands held by his forefathers
without presenting documentation of ownership for the simple reason that “the custom
was for land to be inherited by the eldest of the clan. There was therefore no need for
deeds of sale,” Nietşa explained, though he took care to point out that according to the
(Russian)  provincial  survey  of  1801  the  Iaşlavs  had held  the  land in  question “from
ancient times and without challenge.”29
26 Mansurs and Iaşlavs were well-placed to advance such arguments, for they sat near the
top of the clan hierarchy that structured the elite of the former khanate. The Crimean
definition of nobility held that elite social status depended not on service or proximity to
the  khan,  but  rather  on  the  prestige  and  power  an  individual  or  his  clan  accrued
independently. This definition of elite origins presented a fundamental contradiction to
the formal Russian insistence that all prestige and power derived from the tsar. While
theoretically Georgians, Poles, Ukrainians, Germans and Tatars could all become Russian
nobles, they could do so only by acknowledging that their privileged status was a gift
rather  than  pretending  that  those  privileges  represented  a  curb  on  the  sovereign’s
monopoly on social authority.
27 The number and alignment of clans that composed the ruling elite of the khanate varied
over time, though the main contours remained more or less constant. The khan, his sons,
and other members of the Giray dynasty occupied the top level of the hierarchy, followed
by other descendants of the Chingissid house. The most powerful clans, known as the
karaçi, included a varying combination of the Şirin, Mansur, Sicuvut, Argin, Kipçak and
Iaşlav clans. Next came the ‘princely’ clans, many of whom traced their origins to the
Agyghe (Cherkess) of the north Caucasus, followed by the lesser noble clans headed by
murzas, and finally the kapıhalkı – vassals or dependents who did not originally enjoy the
hereditary  title  of  murza.30 Murza  delegates  provided  just  such  a  description  of  the
Crimean elite to Governor D.B. Mertvago in 1807 in response to his request for a report on
“who among the  mirza  clans  ought  to  be  considered beys.”  This,  they  assured him,
conscious of their audience, was the architecture of what they referred to in various
documents as the “Tatar nobility,” “Muslim nobility” or, on occasion, simply the “Muslim
estate” (magometanskoe soslovie).31
28 In the decades after annexation, a number of murzas served the Russian government in a
civil or military capacity. For the most part however service remained an attribute of,
rather  than  a  stepping  stone  toward,  elite  status.  The  murzas’  primary  goal  was  to
preserve the integrity of Crimean elite society and the prestige of murza status – a status
patents of Russian nobility could confirm but only lineage could confer. Members of the
most powerful clans thus had a stake in the process of identifying legitimate members of
Rethinking elite integration
Cahiers du monde russe, 51/2-3 | 2010
8
the “Muslim nobility” and defining the criteria for future access to the murza ranks. One
of their primary functions was to attest to the worthiness of murzas hoping to join the
ranks  of  the  dvorianstvo.  In  fact,  well  over  half of  those  who  affixed  their  seals  or
signatures  to  such  documents  were  members  of  the  karaçi  clans.  Haji  Ibrahim  aga
Emirov’s 1797 petition is an excellent example. It  included five firmans from Crimean
khans,  three  Russian  attestats describing  the  petitioner’s  military  service,  and  the
testimony of thirteen peers:
We the native (prirodnye) nobles of Tavrida who have affixed our signatures below
out of duty and in accordance with the terms of the charter to the Russian nobility
[…] do testify in regard to Ensign Emir Haji Ibrahim aga and his brothers Abdul-
Kerim and Samadin, that before the annexation of the Crimean peninsula to the
rule of the most glorious Russian state, their fathers and grandfathers served the
sovereign khans. They descended from the knee of the Emirs, have not deviated
from  the  standards  expected  of  them  by  virtue  of  their  birth,  and  conduct
themselves in the manner of noblemen. Because of this we declare them in every
way worthy of this right […] and in assurance of this we sign and affix our seals.
29 The  list  of  witnesses  included  Captain  Arslanşa  murza  Şirin,  Prince  Mehmetşa  bey
Kantakuzin,  State councilor Mehmet aga Biiarslan,  and senior members of  the Argin,
Iaşlav, and Mansur clans, all of whom had either achieved noble rank or been elected to a
position of authority in the provincial administration.32 Their testimony served as a kind
of social currency within Crimea, shoring up the role of a small cluster of murzas as
custodians of both the traditional and imperial social orders.
30 Throughout most of Russian history, lineage was a far more accurate measure of prestige
and power than wealth, and genealogies were useful tools for maintaining kinship bonds
(as well as the host of other interests bound up with them). They were, in the words of an
historian of nobiliários in early modern Portugal, “social accreditation mechanism[s], with
[their] field of action and influence expanding according to people’s expectations and
needs.”  The  efficacy  of  such  mechanisms  improved  dramatically  when  paired  with
antiquity of lineage and, as it did throughout the early modern world, the attraction of
antiquity encouraged subjects of the tsars to indulge in occasional manipulations of the
historical  record.  Fabrication  was  tolerated  within  certain  limits,  but  there  were
narrative conventions to follow and hierarchies to respect. This was particularly so in the
wake of regime change as local practices came under the scrutiny of new authority.33
31 The genealogies of Crimea’s elite clans dated back generations, if not centuries, before the
annexation of the khanate in 1783, and many boasted roots going back to the Kipchak
khanate. The Giray dynasty, of course, descended from the ‘white bone’ – the Chingissid
line that had once dominated the Eurasian steppe. The Şirin clan, second in influence only
to the Girays, looked back to the Volga region and a progenitor whose son, Ruktemir, was
a constant companion and brother-in-law of Khan Tokhtamysh (d. 1395). The Mansurs
identified their clan founder as Davidzh bey – a great chieftain in his  own right,  an
adversary  of  Tokhtamysh,  and  the  great-great-grandson  of  Edigey  (from  whom  the
Iusupov princes claimed descent as well).34
32 Murzas  from  lesser  clans  were  under  added  pressure  to  compose  pitch-perfect
genealogies. In 1804, Abduraman Ulan-oğlu submitted a genealogy that traced the clan to
no less a personage than Oğuz khan, the founder of the Hun and (through descendants)
Seljuk dynasties. According to the document the family descended from the fifth son of
Tiag khan, “who ruled one of the successor states of the Mogul realm when it was divided
among the six sons of Oğuz.” In turn, Abduraman explained, Tiag khan’s sons ruled as a
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result of their “superior descent – unsurpassed among eastern rulers – their excellent
physical  strength and penetrating intellect.”  Eventually,  Abduraman’s  direct  ancestor
moved  westward  to  the  Kipçak  lands  and  from there  to  Crimea,  where  he  received
hereditary land grants from Sahib Giray khan (r.1532-1551).  These lands passed from
generation to generation until they came into the possession of Abduraman himself.35
33 Russian authorities did not challenge the authenticity of  such claims.  Because murza
genealogies had to be approved by peers, there was little point claiming a lineage that
either had no legitimacy or that explicitly challenged the primacy of the elite clans. This
is at least part of the reason why so few murzas claimed anything more than to have
descended  “from  an  ancient  noble  clan.”  It  explains  why  Abduraman  took  care  to
describe his ancestor as the fifth son of Tiag Khan: he was well aware of the importance of
birth order, one of the three distinguishing characteristics of the typical lineage structure
of  Central  Asian  clans  (along  with  genealogical  distance  and  generational  distance).
Abduraman mitigated any potential resistance to his claim by admitting the existence of
lineages superior to his own, as well as by locating the source of his blood honor beyond
the borders of the Crimean-Volga tradition yet still within the prestigious geography of
Turkic empires.
34 Others were less discerning. When the Perekop lower land court inquired in 1822 about
the status of the mysterious Mengli murza Adyl-oğlu, the assembly replied that this was
because, despite his claim of being a kinsman of the Krımtay clan, he was in fact merely a
poor bachelor from the village of Dair whose link to the Krımtays was tenuous at best.36
The murzas showed a similarly cool response to the claims of Ignatii Vasilevich Tatarinov,
formerly known as Ali Dzhangiz Giray sultan. Tatarinov had enlisted in the Russian army
in 1775, retired, entered civil service and earned the rank of titular councilor in 1788. His
saga, recounted in a lengthy petition submitted to the ministry of internal affairs, began
with his return to Crimea from Moscow in 1794. There he found his deceased brother’s
wife and children “poverty stricken, the lands, gardens and other properties belonging to
the clan having been both wrongly distributed to various people by the local government,
and despotically appropriated by the state.”37
35 Tatarinov’s subsequent petitions reflect the intimate knowledge of the Russian system he
gained  working  as  a  striapchii in  the  provincial  courts.  He  grounded  his  arguments,
however,  on principles of kinship familiar to any Crimean. Upon the death of one of
Tatarinov’s  uncles  and  the  emigration  of  another,  he  explained,  “The  Giray  clan’s
hereditary estates,  which from antiquity were held in common without division, and
included villages, lands and other properties in various locations throughout Crimea and
Taman, passed by the right of inheritance into the possession of the third brother.” This
brother  swore  an  oath  of  loyalty  to  the  Russian  sovereign before  passing  away and
leaving his property to his wife, three young sons, and five daughters. Although Tatarinov
declared that he wanted to restore the Giray lands to his nephews, his claim to be their
uncle implied that he, the eldest surviving male, was the rightful heir.38
36 He would get nowhere without an accepted genealogy. But Tatarinov’s incessant petitions
made enemies of many of the men who had acquired the Giray lands, some of whom
exercised a great deal of authority in the province. When the governor began making
inquiries into the matter and found that Tatarinov could not produce a shred of evidence
to back up his claims, he countered that Chingissids had never required documents to
prove their descent. He was a Giray sultan, he argued, if the general public recognized
him as such.39
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37 By calling himself a Giray and playing the part with some art, he was able to convince at
least  a portion of  the Tatar population to treat  him with honor.  But he had trouble
winning over the elite. When officials consulted the Tavrida mufti in 1808, he claimed
that he had never heard of Tatarinov or Ali Dzhangiz Giray for that matter, and the beys
agreed.  Tatarinov  was  no  Giray  prince  and  had  no  claim  to  the  family’s  estates.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that they submitted a single piece of evidence – a genealogy
composed  by  none  other  than  Tatarinov  –  the  assembly  recognized  his  nephews  as
legitimate  sultans  and  “foreign”  nobles.  The  social  status  of  Crimeans,  everyone
concurred, relied not on documentation but on custom and the collective memory of
peers and kin.40
 
From Elite Integration to Ennoblement
38 From the local perspective then, the process of elite integration ran against the grain of
the  increasingly  juridical  and  document-based  ennoblement  procedures  evolving
everywhere from the Qing empire to Provence.41 Like their counterparts in Lithuania,
Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Bessarabia, the Crimean murzas leveraged the customized
privileges granted to them as new subjects (in their case in 1783) against the demands for
uniformity imposed by the terms of the 1785 charter. But as more and more petitions for
noble status from Greeks and Russians as well as murzas arrived in Simferopol it became
clear that officials needed a definitive set of guidelines to navigate the muddy waters of
exceptional circumstances,  cultural differences,  and imperial  standards.  The time had
come to determine the boundaries of murza society and, more importantly, to decide
whether Crimea’s indigenous elite merited formal, collective ennoblement.
39 In early 1815, the Senate solicited the advice of Armand Emmanuel, duc de Richelieu, the
former governor-general of New Russia. The situation in Tavrida, Richelieu explained,
was unique. While a smattering of Greeks were able to produce documents attesting to
their noble worthiness – either from the patriarch of Constantinople or from officers of
the  Black  Sea  fleet  –  most  Tatars  offered nothing but  peer  testimony regarding the
legitimacy  of  their  noble  lineage.  Richelieu  felt  the  government  was  obliged to  give
greater latitude to the Tatars and consider the historical and cultural differences between
Russia and the “Asiatic” states, wherein members of the elite were recognized by virtue of
clan affiliation rather than an accumulation of written documents. The descendants of
the bey clans, high-ranking servants of the khans, and Nogay chiefs, Richelieu suggested,
should  be  required  to  submit  a  combination  of  genealogies  and  peer  testimonies  –
nothing  more.  When  the  Senate  and  State  Council  accepted  Richelieu’s  proposals  it
seemed  the  Crimean  and  Chingissid  geographies  of  nobility  had  been  successfully
integrated into the landscape of imperial nobility.42
40 On 19 August 1816, Emperor Alexander established a “commission on determining the
nobility  of  Muslim and Greek clans”  chaired by the mufti  of  Tavrida and staffed by
representatives  from the  bey  clans,  kapıhalkı,  and Greeks.43 The  commission worked
intermittently for over a decade and, without exception, recommended everyone from
Cherkess princes to low-ranking service murzas for inscription in the fourth part of the
noble register – that reserved for foreign elites. Even men with exemplary military and
civil  service  records  such  as  Captain  Kasim  Argin  and  his  brother,  Court  councilor
Mehmetşa Argin, were registered as foreign nobles because of the fame, antiquity and
honor of their clan. Ismail bey Balatukov, who petitioned for noble status on the basis of
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descent from a line of Cherkess princes, chafed when the Heraldry defined him instead as
noble by virtue of his civil rank. When the Commission on Muslim and Greek clans went
to work in 1820, the deputies received a petition from Ismail’s son, Lieutenant Kazy bey.
“Although the Heraldry ordered that my clan, along with others, be entered in the third
part of the noble register,” wrote Kazy, “because our ancestors descended from Cherkess
princes  I  request  examination  of  the  distinguished  evidence  [to  that  effect]  and
inscription  in  the  fourth  part  of  the  register.”  True  to  form,  the  commission
recommended Kazy and his younger brother, Batyr, for confirmation as nobles of foreign
origin.44 Thus while emperor and Senate conceived the commission as an instrument of
integration and standardization, the Crimean murzas used it to formalize the distinction
between them and the rest of the dvorianstvo.
41 The  viability  of  this  system  died  with  Alexander I.  In  February  1828  his  successor,
Nicholas I, moved to re-establish oversight over the ennoblement process throughout the
empire. He instructed the Senate to investigate reports of rampant abuse – the
submission of falsified documents and fabricated genealogies, for example – and draft a
set of corrective measures. Almost immediately the government turned its attention to
Tavrida and its Muslim murzas. In 1830 Dmitrii Bludov, then acting minister of justice,
initiated an inquiry into the murzas’ status. “What are the rights and privileges of the
murzas and upon what are they based?” he asked provincial officials. What evidence were
they required to present, and what rules had the Senate applied to such cases? Most
tellingly, Bludov wanted to know whether the existing rules were “sufficient to diminish
the number of petitioners, or must new ones be added to account for the poor education
of the Tatars and their coreligionists, as well as their practice of polygamy, which without
a doubt ought to complicate the confirmation of their noble status?”45
42 The government’s concern with the education and morality of the murzas reflected a
growing unease with its predecessor’s willingness to tie social and economic privileges to
ethnic and cultural differences. Previous policy had allowed men like Major Seit Ibrahim
aga Taşı-oğlu, a Crimean whose family had served khans and sultans for generations, to
acquire Russian officer rank and secure ownership of 7,000 desiatinas of orchard, pasture
and arable land. His son and grandson attained entries in the Tavrida noble register and
held officer rank, but like Ibrahim felt no need to convert to Orthodox Christianity or
otherwise alter their cultural identity.46
43 While Crimeans did not necessarily see this as a way of subverting Russian subjecthood,
Nicholaevan officials drew increasingly negative conclusions from the persistence of such
separate elite cultures. The rise of nationalism in the Polish and Ukrainian provinces, and
the fierce resistance mounted by Muslim peoples in the north Caucasus certainly played a
role,  but the decision to redefine noble society was not directed against non-Russian
elites per se. It was part of Nicholas’s concerted effort to centralize and enhance the tsar’s
control over all of imperial society – something he put a premium on after the Decembrist
revolt of 1825.
44 Thus in 1831 the Senate ordered that all noble titles be examined by special commissions,
and three years later it revised the standard of evidence on which petitions for noble
status could be based. ‘Revision commissions’ sprang up all over the empire, particularly
in provinces where the Senate identified an abuse of power by the noble assembly and the
confirmation of unworthy nobles. In some regions, the work of these commissions utterly
transformed noble society. Some 72,000 names were struck from the registers of Podolia,
Volhynia and Kiev alone, while the Olonetsk commission determined that almost half the
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ennobled families in that province were registered incorrectly. Elsewhere, the effect was
muted. The review of Georgian petitions carried out in 1844 declared 25 cases false and
51 “dubious” in nature, but the vast majority (424) authentic.47
45 The Tavrida noble assembly stepped up its  scrutiny as  well.  Almost  immediately the
provincial marshal began transferring murzas and Greeks to the second and third parts of
the noble register in an effort to diminish the perception that in the former khanate
prestige might derive from anything but Romanov favor. Very few murzas sensed (or
reacted to) the changing tide. Captain Ali murza Şirin requested that the assembly revise
its decision to define him as a foreign noble and instead to ground his claim on the fact
“that he received the rank of captain and possessed landed property” like any other
dvorianin. But most waited for the revision commission to carry out its investigations. The
commission opened in 1836 and began reviewing each and every case approved by the
assembly since the compilation of the province’s first noble register in 1804. The four-
man commission reviewed approximately 200 cases and, like commissions throughout the
empire, transferred nearly every noble inscribed in the fourth to the first, second and
third parts of the register (Table 1).48
 
Table 1. Distribution of entries in the noble registers of Kazan and Tavrida, 1785-186049
46 Reshuffling entries in the noble registers was an essential component of the redefinition
of nobility, but it was only the beginning. In March 1840, the State Council at long last
announced the criteria by which the imperial government would officially judge Crimean
Muslim (and Greek) claims to noble status. The Council declared that petitioners could
pursue any of three strategies. They had the option of proving they or their predecessors
had become Russian subjects and obtained rank through service to the tsar. Second, they
could attempt to prove that they had come to Russia prior to 1805, been recognized as a
noble  at  the provincial  level  and obtained immovable  property  through purchase or
inheritance. Muslims had the additional option of proving that they had owned their
estates before 1783 and subsequently served as elected officials. Anyone who met these
criteria had to prove authenticity of lineage by submitting birth and marriage documents
drawn from metrical registers and a genealogy verified by the provincial marshal and
close  relatives  whose  noble  status  had already  been  confirmed.  Finally,  the  council
required each petitioner to submit the sworn testimony of the provincial marshal and
twelve nobles regarding his education and lifestyle.50
47 Only  a  handful  of  petitions  contained  this  range  of  documentation.  In  fact,  most
applicants  were  born  or  married  well  before  the  government  established  metrical
registers for Tavridan Muslims in 1831. The new guidelines thus stripped nearly every
case of murza nobility of its validity. The Heraldry sent hundreds of previously approved
petitions back to Simferopol for supplementary documentation. It cited Seitşa Ahmetov,
for example, for failing to include evidence of either inheriting land owned by his family
prior to 1783 or having been educated “in the proper manner.”51 Er Mambet Dzhamin
suffered disqualification because his rank as sotnik in the Crimean Tatar cavalry regiment
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was not equivalent to that of a regular officer.52 Even members of the bey clans could not
generate sufficient evidence to satisfy the Heraldry. In 1847, Nietşa bey Iaşlav tried to
convince officials of the legitimacy of his status, arguing that his was “one of the seven
bey clans known by all to have descended from the ancient conquerors of Crimea and to
still compose its elite.” Successive khans had issued firmans confirming his forefathers’
estates and testifying to their morality and prestige. Nietşa bey even composed a detailed
genealogy, but his efforts were in vain.53
48 For all but a few exceptional cases, the 1840 State Council decision effectively ended the
process of murza ennoblement in Crimea. Yet its impact was anything but local. Sixty
years earlier Catherine II’s  decision to apply the decree on (Volga) Tatar princes and
murzas to Crimea had briefly reinvented the southern steppe as a continuous landscape
of Muslim Tatar elites.  In subsequent years,  neither the murzas nor imperial officials
embraced that strategy, and elite integration followed different trajectories in various
parts of the empire. By the end of 1796 for example, Paul I had confirmed more than a
dozen of Orenburg’s Tatar clans, while it took 40 years longer for the same number of
Crimean clans to gain confirmation. Meanwhile the empire itself ceased to exist while
Azerbajdzhani begs waited for the Senate to rule on their status.54 Special dispensations,
procedural  idiosyncrasies,  gradations  of  all  kinds  –  all  of  these  created  meaningful
distinctions between regions and between the elite groups that inhabited them.
49 Now, however,  the imperial government’s ennoblement policies began forging (or re-
establishing) linkages among non-Russian, and specifically Muslim, elites. Beginning in
1841, the Senate adapted the terms of the State Council opinion on Tavrida’s Muslim and
Greek clans to conditions in Orenburg and Vilna, where noble assemblies faced similar
challenges  from Bashkirs,  Mordvinians,  and  Lithuanian  Tatars.  The  government  also
applied the model of the commission on Muslim and Greek clans to the Caucasus, where
Viceroy M.S. Vorontsov and his successor, Grand Prince Mikhail Nikolaevich, attempted
to determine the complexion of the hereditary local elite.55
50 Meanwhile  Tavridan  noble  society  –  by  mid-century  a  hybrid  of  unregistered  yet
influential murzas and newly settled pomeshchiki – found a place in an entirely different
elite geography,  joining Bessarabia,  Moscow, and St. Petersburg as a set of  provincial
elites distinguished by common socio-economic features. So few of the dvoriane of these
provinces  possessed  the  quantity  of  souls  (100)  or  land  (300 desiatinas)  required  to
participate in noble assemblies that those assemblies could hardly function. Rather than
allow crucial components of local administration to grind to a halt, the Senate issued a
special dispensation for the nobles of these four provinces.56
51 Curating  the  noble  soslovie,  in  other  words,  was  compounded  by  the  fact  that
commonalities  among elites  often transcended provincial,  regional,  even confessional
boundaries.  The  revision  commissions  and  Senate  decisions  of  the  1830s  and  1840s
simplified  matters,  effectively  narrowing  the  terms  of  inclusion  and  signaling  the
dvorianstvo’s  transformation  from  a  potentially  integrative  tool  into  an  increasingly
monolithic institution. The motivations for this shift are complex, but as Stefan Berger
and Aleksey Miller recently pointed out, ruling groups across nineteenth-century Europe
and  Eurasia  were  busily  seeking  ways  “not  only  to  limit  the  impact  of  separatist
nationalism and political modernization, but also to use these new trends to strengthen
empires.”57 Redrawing the  boundaries  of  noble  society  was  one of  the  tools  at  their
disposal,  though it  did  not  necessarily  bring  the  nobility  any more  in  line  with the
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idealized image of a body of Russian-speaking Orthodox Christians who served the state
and owned large quantities of land and serfs.58
52 Nor was it easy to accomplish. Diversity within the noble estate derived from multiple
sources: from hierarchies laid out in the Table of Ranks and the 1785 charter, from the
terms  of  manifestos  delineating  new  administrative  and  social  entities,  from
geographically – and culturally – specific practices of nobility, and from the self-styling
that was an inherent part of the production of rodoslovnye knigi. Throughout this period,
the parallel processes of elite integration and empire building embedded discrete groups
such  as  the  Crimean  murzas  in  this  evolving  dialogue  about  governance  and  social
structure. If the eventual disaggregation of local elite status and Russian nobility formally
removed murzas from the dvorianstvo, it also generated a reconsideration of the meaning
of nobility that transcended the borders of Tavrida and spread out across Russia’s vast
imperial space.
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ABSTRACTS
Abstract
In tsarist Russia, elite integration was a crucial component of empire building. While the status
claimed by, or ascribed to, non-Russian elites helped determine the relationship between core
and periphery, elite integration had an equally important latitudinal dimension. Careful study of
the nuances of this process in Tavrida province (the former Crimean khanate) suggests that the
ennoblement of borderland figures engendered a reconceptualization of the implications and
accessibility of noble status throughout the empire. The case of the Crimean murzas, explored in
this article, suggests that we rethink the geography of social categories and the dynamics of the
process through which officials and elites curated noble society in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. The murzas were a diminutive population – never more than 500 at a given
time – but they were Muslims in an era of religious toleration, former vassals of the sultan in the
age of Russian-Ottoman rivalry, and heirs to steppe traditions in the midst of Russia’s attempt to
reinvent herself as a European state. Determining whether and how a murza might become a
nobleman therefore had wide-ranging logistical and ideological implications for imperial society.
Résumé
Dans la Russie tsariste, l’intégration des élites était une composante cruciale de l’édification de
l’empire. Alors que les statuts auxquels prétendaient les élites non russes, ou qui leur étaient
attribués, aidaient à déterminer la relation entre le centre et la périphérie, l’intégration des élites
revêtait une dimension latitudinale non moins importante. Une étude attentive des nuances de
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ce processus dans la province de Tauride (l’ex-khanat de Crimée) suggère que l’anoblissement
des  personnages  importants  des  régions  limitrophes  engendrait  une  reconceptualisation  des
implications et de l’accessibilité au statut de noble dans tout l’Empire. Le cas étudié dans cet
article, celui des mourzas de Crimée, propose de repenser la géographie des catégories sociales et
les dynamiques du processus par lequel les officiels et les élites organisaient la société noble à la
fin du XVIIIe et au tout début du XIXe siècle. Les mourzas formaient un groupe de population très
peu nombreux – jamais plus de cinq cents individus à une époque donnée – mais ils  étaient
musulmans dans une période de tolérance religieuse, anciens vassaux du sultan à l’époque de la
rivalité russo-ottomane et héritiers des traditions de la steppe alors que la Russie tentait de se
réinventer comme un État européen. De ce fait, déterminer si et comment un mourza pouvait
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